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Abstract
Background: The state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally
distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about
which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an
early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death,
separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation between the academic fields of priority setting and
badness of death. Our aim is to connect philosophical discussions on the badness of death to contemporary
debates in health priorities.
Discussion: Two questions regarding death are especially relevant to health priorities. The first question is why
death is bad. Death is clearly bad for others, such as family, friends and society. Many philosophers also argue that
death can be bad for those who die. This distinction is important for health priorities, because it concerns our
fundamental reasons for saving lives. The second question is, ‘When is the worst time to die?’ A premature death is
commonly considered worse than a late death. Thus, the number of good life years lost seems to matter to the
badness of death. Concerning young individuals, some think the death of infants is worse than the death of
adolescents, while others have contrary intuitions. Our claim is that to prioritise between age groups, we must
consider the question of when it is worst to die.
Conclusions: Deprivationism provides a more plausible approach to health priorities than Epicureanism. If
Deprivationism is accepted, we will have a firmer basis for claiming that individuals, in addition to having a health
loss caused by morbidity, will have a loss of good life years due to mortality. Additionally, Deprivationism highlights
the importance of age and values for health priorities. Regarding age, both variants of Deprivationism imply that
stillbirths are included in the Global Burden of Disease. Finally, we suggest that the Time-Relative Interest Account
may serve as an alternative to the discounting and age weighting previously applied in the Global Burden of
Disease.
Keywords: Age weighting, Badness of death, Welfare loss, Discounting, Deprivation account, Epicureanism, Global
burden of disease, Health priorities, Morbidity, Time-relative interest account
Background
It is evident that longevity is not equally distributed
across the world [1]. The state of the world is also one
of scarce medical resources. Given such facts, setting
priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoid-
able decisions about which lives to save. Moreover, the
business of saving (i.e., extending) lives works on the as-
sumption that longevity is valuable and that an early
death is generally worse than a late death. There is a vast
literature on health priorities and badness of death, sep-
arately. However, there has been little cross-fertilisation
between these academic fields. Our primary aim is to
connect philosophical discussions on the badness of
death to contemporary debates in health priorities. More
precisely, we will show the relevance of the following
two questions for priorities in health: Why is death bad?
When is the worst time to die?
This paper proceeds as follows. First we outline a case
of illustration that sets the stage for the subsequent dis-
cussion. Next we discuss the question of why death is
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bad. Here we begin by introducing some relevant dis-
tinctions, and then we present two competing theories
on the badness of death, Epicureanism and Deprivation-
ism. We defend Deprivationism and suggest some impli-
cations of this view for health priorities. In the final part
we discuss the question of when is the worst time to die.
Here we present two variants of Deprivationism, one
continuous and one discontinuous. We show the rele-
vance of these two views for health priorities, and sug-
gest that a continuous view is preferable to a
discontinuous one.1
Discussion
A case of illustration
Before we begin, we make three central assumptions.
First of all, that death is followed by permanent non-
existence. Secondly, we presume that there are goods
and evils in life (although we do not presuppose a par-
ticular theory of welfare). Thirdly, that every individual
saved will live until the age of 86, and those not saved
will die within a short time-span. Moreover, we discuss
health priorities from a population perspective, and we
will use the following hypothetical priority case to set
the stage for our discussion. In Table 1, we present six
age groups where each group comprises a thousand
individuals.
Suppose first that we have to choose between E and F.
Here, most people would choose E. One reason is that
the 30-year olds would gain a greater benefit from being
saved. This is in accordance with the greater benefit
principle, which states that resources should be accorded
to the intervention with the greater health benefit [2].
Moreover, the 30-year olds will be more productive, able
to reproduce, and will have people who are dependent
on them such as children and parents. Call this the soci-
etal value principle. Another reason for prioritising E is
that the 30-year olds have had fewer years of life than
the 70-year olds. This is in line with a standard version
of the fair innings principle, according to which re-
sources should be directed to those who have not yet
had their fair share of life [3, 4]. Group E will also draw
support from a modified youngest first principle, accord-
ing to which extra priority should be given to individuals
between 15 and 40 years of age [5]. The principles men-
tioned explain our intuitions about the trade-off between
E and F.
But suppose we have to choose between saving B and
D. How do the principles apply in this case? The youn-
gest first principle and the greater benefit principle
would support saving B over D. According to one ver-
sion of the fair innings principle, it is of moral import-
ance that the infants have lived fewer years than the 15-
year olds, and so have had less of their fair share. How-
ever, both a modified youngest first principle and a soci-
etal value principle would support prioritising D over B.
The question is how these different principles should be
weighed against each other? For example, how import-
ant is societal value in the trade-off between B and D?
On the assumption that all these principles are relevant,
we get a weighing problem. We will not attempt to solve
this problem.
Why is death bad?
All health care systems share two basic goals: saving
lives and improving the quality of life. The first goal
gives rise to two essential questions: (i) Why should we
save lives? (ii) Which lives should we save first? In the
health priorities literature, the second question has re-
ceived the most attention. We believe (i) and (ii) are
closely connected, and that an answer to (ii) presupposes
an answer to (i). In order to make claims about which
lives to save first, we need an account of why we should
save lives in the first place. One justification for saving
lives is simply that death is bad. Saving lives entails post-
poning death, which is justified on the assumption that
an early death is worse than a late death. One could,
however, argue that we should justify saving lives with
reference to considerations of fairness. Although we do
not deny this, our aim is a different one, namely that of
investigating the reasons we have for saving lives that
stem from considerations of the badness of death.
We will briefly clarify the concept of death before we
proceed. “Death” can refer to at least four dimensions:
“the prospect”, “the process”, “the incident” and “the
loss”. The prospect refers to our knowledge of being
mortal, which as far as we know is unique to human be-
ings. The process of dying is an event that may be filled
with pain, as in some instances of cancer, or it may hap-
pen abruptly, as in a traffic accident. The incident of
death is when someone goes from existence to non-
Table 1 Each group comprises 1000 individuals. The groups
saved will live an average of 86 years with a similar average
quality of life. Those not saved will die within a short time-span.
This is in line with the Global Burden of Disease
Group Age Moral principles
A 20-week fetuses YF FI
B Infants YF FI GB
C 5 years YF FI GB
D 15 years FI GB MF SV
E 30 years FI GB MF SV
F 70 years
We note that this case of illustration contains several ceteris paribus claims.
This is necessary in order to focus attention on how different moral principles
work and guide our decisions about which lives to save
Abbreviations: YF youngest first, MF modified youngest first, FI fair innings, SV
societal value, GB greater benefit
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existence. Finally, there is a permanent loss when death
occurs because there is no future for that individual.
Although many tend to focus on the process of dying,
our focus will be on the loss. Arguably, if dying had not
been followed by permanent non-existence, then per-
haps dying would not be so bad after all. Interestingly,
the loss dimension of death seems to play an important
role in current health priorities debates. One example is
the estimation of health loss due to both morbidity and
mortality in traditional cost-effectiveness analyses; an-
other is the Global Burden of Disease project [6]. A third
example is two recent articles by Ezekiel Emanuel and
Govind Persad, which we discuss shortly.
If the loss dimension is accepted, the question is for
whom death represents a loss. There are two rival theories
to this question: Epicureanism and Deprivationism. Epi-
cureanism refers to a contemporary view on the badness
of death inspired by the ancient philosopher Epicurus,
which states that death is not bad for those who die [7–9].
Both theories are compatible with the idea that death can
represent a loss for others (such as family, friends, and so-
ciety), but only Deprivationism accepts that death repre-
sents a loss for those who die [10–19]. First, we discuss
Epicureanism and priority setting implications, followed
by a discussion of Deprivationism.
Epicureanism
The two arguments normally offered in favour of Epicur-
eanism are the experience argument and the time argu-
ment. The experience argument is best illustrated by the
expression, “What you don’t know won’t hurt you”. One
interpretation of this is that in order for something to be
good or bad for us, we must experience its goodness or
badness. But of course when we are dead, we cannot ex-
perience. Therefore, death cannot be good or bad for us.
There are, in fact, cases within life where something is
good or bad for us, even if we cannot experience it.
Roughly speaking, we can imagine two types of such
cases, moral and medical. Examples of moral cases are
infidelity, lying, tale bearing, and stealing. It can be ar-
gued that such actions are wrong independently of
whether those affected by cheating and lying will experi-
ence this [17]. Examples of medical cases are prevention,
loss of senses, coma, asymptomatic diseases and risk fac-
tors. For instance, it seems clear that having cancer is
bad for a patient even before the cancer is detected.2 If
we accept that there are goods and evils within our lives
that we cannot experience, we are left with no reason to
deny that death can be a similar evil.
The time argument states that for something to be
good or bad for us, there must be a time at which things
are good or bad for us. But death is not good or bad for
us while being alive. Nor is death good or bad for us
while being dead. Since there is no time at which death
is good or bad for the person who dies, death cannot be
good or bad for this person [19].
There are at least four views one can adopt in
responding to this argument. One view is that death is
bad before it occurs, another is that death is bad when it
occurs, a third is that death is bad after it occurs, and a
fourth is that death is bad at a time which cannot be
easily identified. One can successfully object to the time
argument on the basis of one of these four views. We
believe the fourth view is the best strategy for respond-
ing to the time argument. Here are some cases of ana-
logy in support of the fourth view. For example, never
having an education, freedom, or children can be bad
even if its badness cannot be ascribed to a specific time.
Moreover, at times, people may be grateful for not being
a victim of accidents or suffering from severe sickness,
even if “the evils that they never suffered” cannot be so
easily located in time. Finally, consider a case of preven-
tion. Somewhat paradoxically, prevention works when
nothing happens. When, for instance, a vaccine proves
successful, the individual does not suffer the disease in
question. The good that follows from not suffering the
disease does not occur at a particular time.3 If these ex-
amples are accepted, it follows that there are goods and
evils within life that cannot be so easily located in time.
In our view, death is an analogous evil in this sense.
If one accepts either the experience- or the time argu-
ment, it follows that death cannot be bad for those who
die. What does this imply with regard to health prior-
ities? If death is no loss for those who die, it matters less
whether we suffer a premature or a late death. Conse-
quently, age will play a less significant role (if any role at
all) to health priorities. With Epicureanism we are, how-
ever, left with the option that death is bad for third par-
ties such as family, friends, and society. This implies a
higher emphasis on saving lives for the sake of others.
Moreover, this suggests that what matters from a moral
point of view are things like the emotional attachments
and investments of family, friends, and society. In
addition, the death of individuals can be bad by virtue of
being a loss of caring relationships, productivity, or sim-
ply in terms of the world being deprived of a person.
While these considerations are no doubt important,
none of them concern the individuals who stand at risk
of dying prematurely. But this is clearly problematic.
Epicureanism would still fail to account sufficiently for
those who are already orphans, those without friends
and people who are not productive in society. More pre-
cisely, it fails to account for our obligations to save indi-
viduals’ lives for their own sake. In this sense,
Epicureanism would be radically different from current
priority practice, where we primarily save lives for the
sake of the individual whose life it is. In view of these
remarks, Epicureanism is vulnerable to important
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objections and fails to capture everything we care about
when saving lives.
Deprivationism
In this part, we offer a positive account of Deprivation-
ism. This account is inspired by Thomas Nagel, who
says that, ‘If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because
of its positive features, but only because of what it de-
prives us of ’ [17]. Some things in life can be good or bad
in themselves, such as pleasure and pain. Death, on the
other hand, is a different kind of evil. Suppose you suf-
fered from paralysis in both your legs as a result of an
accident. This accident deprives you of the chance to do
a lot of things, like walking or playing tennis. In a similar
way, death deprives us of the opportunity to continue
with our lives. And assuming that continued life con-
tains value, death is bad for us. Deprivationism explains
how we can make judgments concerning the badness of
death by comparing at least two different outcomes: (a)
how well off individuals would have been if they contin-
ued to live and (b) how good it is for individuals not to
continue with their lives. As long as (a) is better than
(b), death is an evil. In some cases (b) might be better
than (a), in which case death is not necessarily an evil
[15].
Deprivationism is the standard view on the badness of
death. We suggest that Deprivationism is relevant to
health priorities in at least four areas. First, Deprivation-
ism brings attention to the kinds of values that are lost
when death occurs. Secondly, it emphasises that age
matters. Thirdly, Deprivationism will favour a person-
affecting theory.4 Fourthly, it may say something new
about who the worst off are.5 Jointly these four areas can
provide reasons for saving lives. In what follows, we dis-
cuss the first two areas of relevance in more detail.
With regard to values, it should be clear that they are
lost when death occurs. But exactly what kinds of values
are lost? Philosophers typically discuss the values that
occur within our lives, with less attention being given to
the values that death deprives us of. Here, we highlight
some categories of values that are important when
thinking about death. One dimension is value for others,
such as ‘societal value’. This type of value has two di-
mensions, a wide and a narrow one. Call wide societal
value the value individuals have or can have for society,
for example, productivity and societal investments. Call
narrow societal value the value individuals have or can
have for friends and family. Importantly, Deprivationism
highlights a second value dimension, namely the value
of the future of an individual if he or she is saved. Call
this ‘personal value’, which in our context refers to the
values lost when individuals die.6
When a death occurs we tend to focus on the loss of
the good or bad conditions present in us, such as
knowledge, language, and memory. This is undoubtedly
important, but death also causes a loss of future possibil-
ities. This entails a focus on good or bad potential future
states of individuals. It includes everything the future
might hold for them, such as having intimate relation-
ships, having aesthetical experiences, and simply enjoy-
ing the pleasures of life. In this sense, death is bad to the
extent that it deprives individuals of personal value. If
one accepts that personal value is important, and that
personal value is lost when death occurs, then it follows
that we have reasons to prevent death or save lives for
the sake of those whose life it is.
Regarding age, there is an on-going debate about
whether it should matter to health priorities at all, indir-
ectly or as an independent criterion [20]. We suggest
that age indicates something about three important di-
mensions: life stage, years lived, and future life years.
Deprivationism focuses on life stage and future welfare.
Life stage is important because it says something about
the extent to which individuals have ownership to their
future. Future life years indicate the potential future in-
dividuals can have. Moreover, if we accept either life
stage or years lived, age will matter. This means that if
we accept Deprivationism, it follows that age is morally
relevant to health priorities. In any case, it seems that
age will matter somehow to priorities in health.
When is the worst time to die?
Though the idea that age matters to health priorities has
gained a certain acceptance, there is bound to be dis-
agreement about which age groups to prioritise. This
issue is the subject of contemporary debate. Since the
launch of the Millennium Development Goals, mother
and child campaigns have been high on the agenda. The
goal of reducing under-five mortality has received spe-
cial attention. In 2015, we got new Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals that replaced the Millennium Development
Goals [21]. Against this background, one important
question is whether to give special attention to infants
and young children, on the one hand, or to adolescents
and young adults, on the other. Our claim is that in
order to prioritise between age groups, it is relevant to
consider the question of when it is worst to die.
As a starting point, we propose to consider some
claims about death drawn from the health priorities
literature:
“It is terrible when an infant dies, but worse, most
people think, when a three-year-old child dies and
worse still when an adolescent does” [22].
“While every premature death is distressing, death in
childhood is particularly tragic, as children lose more
future years and stages of life than adults” [23].
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“The death of a 20-year-old young woman is intui-
tively worse than that of a 2-month-old girl, even
though the baby has had less life” [5].
The second paragraph states the intuition that death is
worse the earlier it occurs. In this sense, Colleen C.
Denny & Ezekiel J. Emanuel support a youngest first
principle [23]. In their article, they motivated a greater
focus in the USA on prioritising mothers and young
children. The first paragraph presents the intuition that
the death of adolescents is worst, whereas in the third
paragraph it is assumed that the death of young adults is
worse than the death of young children. The intuitions
stated in the first and third paragraphs support a modi-
fied youngest first principle while the greater benefit
principle is here given less weight. The paragraphs dem-
onstrate three things. First of all, intuitions about death
play a role in justifying certain priority principles. Sec-
ondly, such intuitions diverge on the issue of when it is
worst to die. Thirdly, the authors are silent on the dis-
tinction between death as bad for those who die and
death as bad for others.
When intuitions conflict, as in the question of when it
is worst to die, reasoning becomes especially important.
To this end, Deprivationism can provide theoretical sup-
port. To begin with, an early death is worse than a late
death. Age and the number of good life years lost matter
to the badness of death. Different theories exist about
the badness of death. Some theories consider the death
of infants worst, while others consider the deaths of
young individuals to be worst. We will focus on depriva-
tionist theories, which comes in continuous and discon-
tinuous forms. The Deprivation Account is an example
of a discontinuous theory, whereas the Time-Relative
Interest Account is an instance of a continuous theory.
The deprivation account
The standard view on Deprivationism is the Deprivation
Account. According to this account, death is generally
worse the more good life years it deprives us of. This im-
plies that death is worse the earlier it occurs. Given this
claim, some have questioned the plausibility of the
Deprivation Account. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, be-
lieves this account amounts to what he calls ‘the simple
loss view’. According to Dworkin’s interpretation of the
Deprivation Account, the badness of death is only a
function of the amount of life lost when someone dies.
Applied to our case of illustration, this would favour sav-
ing group A (20-week fetuses). Dworkin claims that this
is counterintuitive. He argues that if the loss of life years
were the only thing that mattered, then an early stage
abortion would be a worse than a late stage abortion. He
points out that almost everyone holds the contrary as-
sumption; late stage abortion is worse than early stage
abortion. Thus, there is a conflict between the simple
loss view and people’s intuitions [22].
Why is the simple loss view incorrect? On Dworkin’s
account, it is incorrect because it only focuses on future
possibilities. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
the simple loss view is only one variant of the
Deprivation Account, something Dworkin overlooks.
More precisely, he fails to capture the discontinuous na-
ture of the Deprivation Account. It is worth noting that
it is not only the loss that matters, but also to whom the
loss belongs. If we consider “those who never existed”
due to infertility and contraceptives, such “losses” are
not equivalent to death. In order for a loss to be per-
sonal, the future must belong to the one who dies. Those
who subscribe to the Deprivation Account must explain
the difference between the loss associated with “those
who never existed”, and the loss associated with death.
They will need to rely on a notion of personal identity to
explain this difference. Personal identity refers to those
properties necessary to make an individual at t1 numer-
ically identical with himself at t2 [12]. In this sense per-
sonal identity gives someone “ownership” to his loss of
life. In Fig. 1, we have tried to illustrate the importance
of personal identity for the Deprivation Account.
Since there are different views on personal identity,
there are different variants of the Deprivation Account.
The crucial question for this account is therefore when
we acquire personal identity (i.e., when we begin to
exist). Before personal identity is acquired, death repre-
sents no loss. As soon as personal identity is acquired,
death is the greatest loss. The figure shows some pos-
sible views on personal identity: soul, brain, conscious-
ness, and self-consciousness. For example, if a soul (or
DNA) is what grants personal identity, then death is the
greatest evil right after conception. This, however, con-
flicts with widely held views on termination of preg-
nancy, spontaneous abortions, and the use of in-vitro
fertilization clinics.
Our aim here is not to defend any particular concep-
tion of personal identity; nevertheless, it is clear that
some conceptions are preferable to others. For example,
in order for Dworkin’s interpretation of the Deprivation
Account to be correct (i.e., the simple loss view), he
would have to argue that personal identity is acquired at
conception. As far as we know, Dworkin does not pro-
vide such an argument in his work. Moreover, there are
good reasons for doubting that personal identity is ac-
quired at conception. First of all, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that humans cannot be individuated before the
point in development when twinning could occur. Avail-
able evidence suggests that twinning can occur within
two weeks after conception [24]. Furthermore, it is
unresonable that DNA grants personal identity since
separate individuals can have the same DNA, such as
Solberg and Gamlund BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:21 Page 5 of 9
monozygotic twins and dicephalic twins. Secondly, there
exist convincing arguments against a soul view [12].
Finally, very few defenders of the Deprivation Account
claim that personal identity is acquired at conception.
Given these remarks, some of the standard criticism of
the Deprivation Account may be off target [12]. This in-
cludes the criticism by Dworkin and that related to abor-
tion [22]. Moreover, very few believe that self-
consciousness is what gives us personal identity. On the
most promising accounts, personal identity is acquired
between five months of fetal life and birth [12, 17]. Thus,
death is the greatest evil in this time period. The individ-
uals in question will lose the most good life years, and
they will (in virtue of acquired personal identity) possess
an ownership to that loss.
How exactly is the Deprivation Account relevant to
health policy? One case in point is the Global Burden of
Disease study. In the most recent version of this study,
birth is treated as morally significant. Death right after
birth generates 86 Disability Adjusted Life Years
(DALYs), whereas death right before birth generates 0
DALYs. Thus, the study implies that preventing the
death of infants is the most important health interven-
tion, while preventing stillbirths is of little (if any) im-
portance. Inevitably, a study like the Global Burden of
Disease comes with certain normative presuppositions.
This is not necessarily problematic in itself. However,
the treatment of birth as morally significant, is problem-
atic and in need of a defence. Although such a claim
might find philosophical support, to our knowledge no
such view is defended in the badness of death literature
[25]. Given the framework that we discuss here, the Glo-
bal Burden of Disease study might gain theoretical
support from the Deprivation Account. But this would
imply the inclusion of stillbirths.
One may ask whether personal identity is relevant to
the question of which lives to save. An important criti-
cism of the Deprivation Account emphasises the fact
that it relies on personal identity. For one thing, the con-
cept of personal identity depends on metaphysical pre-
suppositions that many regards with suspicion. For
another, even if we accept the concept of personal iden-
tity, there is bound to be disagreement on how the con-
cept should be understood. This suggests that from a
pragmatic point of view, one can question whether a re-
liance on personal identity is helpful in the context of
setting priorities in health. In summary, such criticism of
the Deprivation Account has motivated the development
of an alternative continuous view on the badness of
death.
The time-relative interest account
In our view, the most promising continuous view at the
moment is Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Ac-
count [12, 26]. Following this account, death is an evil by
virtue of two factors: the number of good life years lost
(similar to the Deprivation Account), and how psycho-
logically connected one is to the future that is lost. On
this account, personal identity is not what matters to the
badness of death; rather it is individuals’ psychological
development. What binds us to the future in a morally
relevant way are direct psychological connections—such
as memory, language, beliefs, intentions, expectations,
values and knowledge—and the continuity of those con-
nections [12]. Such direct psychological connections
obviously come in degrees. Since psychological
Fig. 1 The Deprivation Account and personal identity. The figure illustrates how the Deprivation Account relies on personal identity from
a population perspective. This is not a priority curve, but rather a badness of death curve. There are actually three graphs in one, each
represented by a stipulated line. The y-axis represents the badness of death for those who die. The x-axis represents age with an
emphasis on the fetal life. Each vertical line represents a view on personal identity. Moreover, these vertical lines illustrate the
discontinuity of the Deprivation Account
Solberg and Gamlund BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:21 Page 6 of 9
connectedness is a matter of degree and is what grants
ownership to the future, such ownership will have to
come in degrees. In Fig. 2, we present our interpretation
of the Time-Relative Interest Account. Notably, this
curve is continuous because, according to this account,
ownership to the future is graded in accordance with
age, understood as the life stage of individuals.
According to the Time-Relative Interest Account, psy-
chological connectedness starts with the development of
a brain. By approximately six months of fetal life, such
connections are very weak.7 The value of psychological
connectedness goes from zero and up to a threshold. By
the time individuals reach approximately ten years of
age, they have reached a threshold in the sense that their
psychological connections have become sufficiently
strong to ground a complete ownership to the future.
What does this imply for our case of illustration? We
believe that the degree of ownership to the future might
serve as a weighting function for the welfare loss caused
by death. If this is accepted, the Time-Relative Interest
Account implies that those in Group D have complete
ownership of their future. Since individuals older than
10 years of age have complete ownership, the
Deprivation Account will account for the badness of
death for individuals older than 10 years of age. If the
badness of death for those who die were the only thing
that mattered to health priorities, it would mean that
Group D should be favoured over the other groups. The
Time-Relative Interest Account does not necessarily
guide us in choosing between Groups B and E, but both
groups seem to be favoured over Group F. The
Deprivation Account, on the other hand, would clearly
favour Group B. Group A is given least priority by both
the Deprivation Account and the Time-Relative Interest
Account because those in this group lack a morally
relevant connection to their future. As pointed out by
Jeff McMahan, it is as “if the future it loses might just as
well have belonged to someone else” [12].
Returning to the Global Burden of Disease, there is
considerable debate as to whether future health benefits
should be discounted, and if so, why they should be dis-
counted. Three reasons are often mentioned in favour of
discounting. First of all, the future is surrounded by un-
certainty; secondly, people have weaker preferences for
future goods; and finally, future health interventions will
improve [27]. In some previous studies of the Global
Burden of Disease, DALYs have been time-discounted
and age-weighted. Many are sceptical, however, that a
theoretical foundation for discounting future health ben-
efits can be offered. Even so, it should be noted that the
badness of death curve for the Time-Relative Interest
Account would be similar to a time-discounted and age-
weighted DALY curve, albeit for different reasons that
was used in previous studies of the Global Burden of
Disease [28].
The Time-Relative Interest Account can offer a philo-
sophical foundation for a similar Global Burden of Dis-
ease curve without relying on discounting or age
weighting in the traditional sense. As mentioned, the
Time-Relative Interest Account weights future benefits
in accordance with the psychological connectedness in-
dividuals are expected to have according to life stage. Of
course, when discussing priorities in health we are in
fact discussing reductions in both morbidity and mortal-
ity. By taking into account reductions in morbidity, mat-
ters become complicated when considering the
implications of the Time-Relative Interest Account. Our
suggested weighting function for future health benefits
according to age is with regard to mortality only. The
curve in Fig. 2 peaks somewhere around ten years of
Fig. 2 The Time-Relative Interest Account. This is our interpretation of the Time-Relative Interest Account applied on a population perspective.
Again this is not a priority curve, but a badness of death curve. The y-axis represents the badness of death for those who die. The x-axis
represents age, once again with an emphasis on fetal life. The curve peaks somewhere around ten years of age. In our figure, we suggest a
grading from 0 to 1, where 0 is no ownership and 1 is full ownership
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age. In this figure, we suggest a grading from 0 to 1,
where 0 is no ownership and 1 is full ownership. As an
alternative to time discounting, the suggested grading
might serve as a weighting function for DALYs.
What does this imply with regard to saving lives? Sup-
pose we must prioritise between Group B and Group D in
our illustrated case. Following the Deprivation Account,
we should save Group B since 86 DALYs are generated
when infants die, whereas only 71 DALYs are generated
when 15-year-olds die. Following the Time-Relative Inter-
est Account, on the other hand, we should save Group D
(15-year olds). This is because the individuals in Group B
do not have complete ownership to their future, whereas
the individuals in Group D have acquired complete own-
ership. This might be formalised as follows: infants 86
DALYs × 0.5 = 43 weighted DALYs, whereas 15-year olds
71 DALYs × 1 = 71 weighted DALYs. More thinking is
needed on how the weighting rates should be operational-
ized. Still, we believe we have shown that the Time-
Relative Interest Account implies some form of weighting.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed different theories on the
badness of death and showed some of their implications
for health priorities. We have introduced an important
distinction between the badness of death for others and
the badness of death for those who die. Our conclusion
is that Deprivationism provides a more plausible ap-
proach to health prioritisation than Epicureanism. If
Deprivationism is accepted, we will have a firmer basis
for claiming that individuals, in addition to having a
health loss caused by morbidity, will have a loss of good
life years due to mortality. Deprivationism highlights the
importance of age and values for health priorities. With
regard to age, both variants of Deprivationism imply that
stillbirths should be included in the Global Burden of
Disease. Finally, we suggest that the Time-Relative Inter-
est Account may serve as an alternative to the discount-
ing and age weighting previously applied in the Global
Burden of Disease. We consider this work to be a first
step and have suggested some starting points for further
debate. It is our hope that this discussion can stimulate
more thinking on how Deprivationism might be
strengthened and implemented in health priorities.
Endnotes
1This paper builds on some ideas that we have devel-
oped previously in a Norwegian paper. See [29].
2The following case can serve as an objection to our
argument. Suppose that A and B both have asymptom-
atic cancer. A’s doctor tells A, whereas B’s doctor does
not tell B. One may ask whose life is better between the
time of diagnosis and the time at which B begins to ex-
perience symptoms? Some would claim that B’s life has
been better, because knowing that he had asymptomatic
cancer has psychologically harmed A. Thanks to Alan
Wertheimer for pointing this out.
3As pointed out to us by Guy Schofield, it might be that
vaccination is a good at the time one is re-exposed to the
agent from which one was vaccinated. In response to this,
we think it is important to distinguish between (a) the
causal effect of the vaccine, and (b) the benefit from the
vaccination. Although causal effects occur at specific
times, it does not follow that the benefit from the vaccin-
ation – in the sense of the disease one never got – can be
ascribed to particular times in the same way.
4Deprivationism seems to emphasise what is called a
‘person-affecting claim’, which means that nothing can
be bad if it is bad for no individual. We think Depriva-
tionism can be relevant to the trade-off between extend-
ing existing lives and creating new lives, i.e., extending
existing lives is more important than creating new ones.
5The ‘worst off ’ may refer to the sickest, either cur-
rently or in the past, or it may refer to those who have
lived the shortest lives. With reference to the badness of
death, the worst off may be those who suffer the greatest
loss. There is also a question about how to understand
the concept of being worst off. For example, there is an
on-going discussion about whether it is possible to be
worst off in an absolute sense. Some argue that we can
only be worse off in a relative sense. Our hypothesis is
that Deprivationism, by emphasising intra-individual
counterfactual reasoning, may provide an original argu-
ment for an absolute conception of the worst off.
6Our notion of personal value does not presuppose
any specific theory of welfare. It is compatible with he-
donism, preference satisfaction theory, and objective list
theories. It is important to note that we are interested in
welfare in a personal rather than an impersonal sense.
7It is, of course, an empirical question when the
neurogenesis begins. Moreover, there is currently dis-
agreement on exactly when awareness is realised in the
fetal life.
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